Section 1983 in State Court: A Remedy for Unconstitutional State Taxation by Taylor, William L
Section 1983 in State Court: A Remedy
for Unconstitutional State Taxation
William L. Taylor4
Victims of federally unconstitutional state taxation are currently with-
out adequate means to vindicate their federal rights.1 State-provided reme-
dies do not furnish these victims with sufficient incentive to challenge the
constitutionality of such taxation.2 Given that unconstitutional taxation is
a deprivation of federal rights under color of state law, and thus within
the ambit of 42 U.S.c. § 1983,' the remedies available under that section,
including attorney's fees for successful claimants, could fill the void left by
the inadequacy of state remedies. The traditional fora for section 1983
claims, the federal district courts, are not available for state tax section
1983 actions, however, because federal law prohibits these courts from
interfering with state taxation.4 Thus, taxpayers must take their section
1983 claims to state courts. Notwithstanding their obligation to entertain
section 1983 actions generally,5 most state courts have refused to entertain
state tax section 1983 claims.' As a consequence, the federal constitutional
rights of state taxpayers are not adequately protected.
This Note argues that this result is unacceptable. Part I demonstrates
that a meaningful state tax section 1983 cause of action in state court is
t The author would like to express his appreciation to Lea Brilmayer and Henry L. Parr, Jr. for
their helpful comments, and to C. Waitman Taylor, Jr. for reasons so numerous and involved that
they are beyond the scope of this Note.
1. This Note analyzes state taxation that violates the U.S. Constitution. That the taxation may
also violate state constitutional provisions does not affect this analysis.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 8-10.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat.
13, 13. Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
In the landmark case of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court extended the
civil rights remedies under § 1983 beyond the context of racial discrimination to other violations of the
Constitution. Section 1983 now provides a federal cause of action to "taxpayers, or anyone else who
[is] able to prove that his constitutional or federal rights [have] been denied by any State." Fair
Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 103-04 (1981).
4. The broad policy of federal court noninterference with state taxation prevents federal district
courts from entertaining challenges to state taxation. See infra text accompanying notes 14-34.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 52-74.
6. See infra note 79.
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necessary to ensure the protection of the federal rights of state taxpayers. 7
Part II argues that state courts must entertain section 1983 actions gener-
ally, and Part III concludes that these courts are required to hear state tax
section 1983 actions as well.
I. THE NEED FOR A STATE TAX SECTION 1983 CAUSE OF ACTION
IN STATE COURT
The remedies provided under section 1983 are essential if the victims of
unconstitutional taxation are to obtain redress. Because federal courts are
not open to taxpayers with section 1983 actions, state courts must stand
ready to entertain these claims.
A. The Deficiency of State Remedies
All states have remedies available to taxpayers who successfully chal-
lenge the federal constitutionality of state tax laws or procedures.8 The
problem with many of these state remedies, however, is that they do not
provide taxpayers with sufficient incentive to vindicate their federal rights.
In particular, most states do not allow taxpayers who successfully chal-
lenge state taxation to recover attorney's fees.9 As a result, a state is left
7. The analysis of this Note is directed both at unconstitutional statutes and at unconstitutional
assessment practices and procedures. Although courts, especially federal courts, appear to be reluctantto embroil themselves in tax assessment disputes, see, e.g., McNary, 454 U.S. at 107 n.4, taxpayers
challenging unconstitutional tax assessment practices may be in need of greater protection than tax-payers challenging the constitutionality of a state tax statute. A single vindictive tax assessor has thepower to tax unconstitutionally by, for example, assessing the property of members of a particularpolitical party at double the normal rate. An unconstitutional statute, on the other hand, must be
approved by an entire legislative body and usually by the state's executive branch as well. Because
those subject to the caprice of a tax assessor have fewer checks on the source of the unconstitutional
taxation, they arguably have a greater need for effective means to protect their rights.8. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 133.120 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1984) (providing appeal from
tax assessments); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134.590 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982) (providing for refund of
"taxes held unconstitutional"); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 139.031 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (providing actionfor recovery of taxes paid under protest); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-47-220 (Law. Co-op 1976) (same).Indeed, even if a state did not have a statutory remedy for unconstitutional taxation, the taxpayer
would have a remedy directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Ward v. Board of CountyComm'rs, 253 U.S. 17, 24 (1920) (taxpayers allowed to recover unconstitutionally collected taxes
notwithstanding that no statutory cause of action had been provided by state); cf. General Oil Co. v.Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908) (taxpayer must have remedy for unconstitutional state taxation).
9. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 133.120, 134.590; Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462,480 (Ky. 1974) ("Kentucky follows the general rule which does not permit the allowance of attorneys'fees in the absence of a statute or contract expressly providing therefor."); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 139.031; Mayor of Liberty v. Beard, 636 S.W.2d 330, 331 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (per curiam)("The rule in Missouri is that absent statutory authorization or contractual agreement, each litigant,
with few exceptions, must bear the expense of his own attorneys' fees. . . ."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-47-270 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (limiting costs in actions to recover taxes paid under protest); Hegler v.Gulf Ins. Co., 270 S.C. 548, 549, 243 S.E.2d 443, 444 (1978) ("As a general rule, attorney's fees are
not recoverable [in South Carolina] unless authorized by contract or statute."); see also State TaxComm'n v. Fondren, 387 So. 2d 712 (Miss. 1980) (en banc) (taxpayers unable to collect attorney's
fees under state statutes), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981).
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free to extract small sums unconstitutionally from its taxpayers. For ex-
ample, a state could enact a statute under which all resident aliens would
be taxed an additional $1.00 per year, or a single malicious tax assessor
could slightly overassess the property of nonresidents of the state. As a
purely economic matter, these taxpayers would be better off paying the
unconstitutional tax than incurring the legal fees necessary to challenge
the tax.'0
Section 1983 offers an alternative to inadequate state remedies. Con-
gress enacted section 1983 to provide a civil remedy for deprivations of
federal rights under color of state law, such as unconstitutional taxation.
To further the goals of section 1983, Congress passed the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 ("section 1988")," which provides
for the recovery of attorney's fees by successful plaintiffs in a number of
actions including those under section 1983.12 Because the monetary dam-
10. The facts of a recent case, Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 281 S.C. 492, 316 S.E.2d
386 (1984), affd by an equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam), serve to illus-
trate the problem. The Spencers, residents of North Carolina, earned all of their income in South
Carolina and were subject to South Carolina income tax provisions. South Carolina had a statute
which denied non-residents certain deductions and therefore taxed these individuals more heavily than
otherwise similar South Carolina residents. The amount of the tax illegally imposed on the Spencers
was under $600.00, substantially less than the expense necessary to challenge the constitutionality of
the statute. Although the statute was patently unconstitutional, the unavailability of attorney's fees
reduced the Spencers' incentive to challenge the statute. In addition, because the Spencers were not
residents of South Carolina and were therefore ineligible to vote in South Carolina elections, they had
no opportunity to effect a change in the statute through the political process.
11. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982)). Section 1988
provides in pertinent part:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and
1986 of this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than
the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
12. Congress enacted § 1988 to provide an exception in civil rights cases to the "American rule"
which, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421
U.S. 240 (1975), would not allow a successful plaintiff in a civil rights action to recover attorney's
fees. See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5911-12. Section 1988 applies to actions under § 1983 whether they are brought in
federal or state court. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1980). A successful plaintiff may
recover attorney's fees under § 1988 even if the court does not reach the plaintiff's § 1983 action, if
the § 1983 claim is substantial and if the state law claim on which the plaintiff prevailed and the §
1983 claim both arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122,
132 n.15 (1980); see also Stratos v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 316-20, 439 N.E.2d
778, 782-85 (1982) (granting attorney's fees under § 1988 even though court did not reach plaintiff's
§ 1983 claim because he had prevailed on his state law claim). Although § 1988 gives courts discretion
in awarding attorney's fees, this discretion is quite limited. Congress stated that a prevailing plaintiff
"'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust."' See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5908, 5912 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per curiam));
see also Johnson v. Blum, 58 N.Y.2d 454, 457-59, 448 N.E.2d 449, 450-51, 461 N.Y.S.2d 782,
783-84 (1983) (per curiam) (attorney's fees must be awarded absent "special circumstances").
In the debates over § 1988, Congress noted the importance of attorney's fees in ensuring the protec-
tion of federal rights. See 122 CONG. REC. 35,128 (1976) (remarks of Rep. Seiberling) ("In fact, a
failure to authorize the awarding of attorneys' fees in civil rights cases will, as a practical matter,
repeal the civil rights laws for most Americans."); id. at 35,127 (remarks of Rep. Holtzman) ("[Sec-
tion 19881 will help to assure that all Americans can have access to the courts to obtain the protections
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age resulting from unconstitutional taxation may not be large enough to
make it worthwhile for an individual taxpayer to incur the legal fees nec-
essary to challenge the tax, the availability of attorney's fees can make the
difference between protecting the federal rights of taxpayers and allowing
violations to go unredressed.13
B. The Unavailability of Federal Courts for State Tax Section 1983
Claims
Taxpayer challenges to unconstitutional state taxation, even those chal-
lenges brought pursuant to section 1983, are not actionable in federal
court."' Federal courts are precluded from entertaining state tax section
1983 claims by a long-standing policy of federal judicial noninterference
with state taxation. This policy is embodied in the Tax Injunction Act,15
the Eleventh Amendment, 6 and the principle of comity as articulated by
the Supreme Court in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association v.
McNaryY1
The Tax Injunction Act bars federal courts from granting prospective
relief-either injunctive or declaratory 18-from unconstitutional state tax-
ation."9 The Act prohibits federal district courts from restraining a state in
its taxing power if a "plain, speedy and efficient remedy" is available in
against discrimination contained in our laws and the Constitution."); see also Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at
11 (noting importance of § 1988 to § 1983 claimants).
13. The Senate Report on the Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 noted: "If our civil rights laws
are not to become mere hollow pronouncements which the average citizen cannot enforce, we must
maintain the traditionally effective remedy of fee shifting in these cases." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5908, 5913 (emphasis added).
The lower South Carolina court in Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n upheld the Spencers'
challenge to the constitutionality of the tax statute, but refused to entertain their § 1983 claim and
therefore denied their request for attorney's fees. No. 81-CP-23-3844 (S.C.C.P. Oct. 29, 1982). It is
interesting that the court characterized the Spencers' success as a "hollow victory." Id. at 3.
14. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 122 (1984) ("Challenges to
the validity of state tax systems under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . .must be brought in state court.") (citing
Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981)).
15. Pub. L. No. 75-332, 50 Stat. 738 (1937) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982)).
Section 1341 provides:
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of
any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts
of such State.
16. The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
17. 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
18. Although the Tax Injunction Act on its face restrains federal district courts only from grantinginjunctions, the Supreme Court has held that it also prevents those courts from granting declaratory
relief. See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982).
19. For a general discussion of the Tax Injunction Act, see Note, The Tax Injunction Act and
Suits for Monetary Relief, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 736 (1979).
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state court.20 That the taxpayer is seeking relief under section 1983 is
irrelevant.2" Moreover, the prohibition applies whether the action is insti-
tuted against the state directly or against a state official in either her indi-
vidual or official capacity.22
Just as the Tax Injunction Act prevents federal courts from granting
equitable relief from unconstitutional taxation, the Eleventh Amendment
prohibits these courts from granting relief in the form of money damages
from such taxation. The Eleventh Amendment bars federal district courts
from entertaining actions seeking retroactive relief against a state. 23 Al-
though Congress has the authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to override the Eleventh Amendment, 24 the Supreme Court
has held that Congress did not exercise that authority when it enacted
section 1983.25 Thus, the Eleventh Amendment prevents a taxpayer from
asserting a section 1983 damages action in federal court against a state.
Like other section 1983 claimants, taxpayers cannot circumvent the
prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment by bringing suit against the ap-
propriate state official (i.e., the state treasurer) in her official capacity,
because federal court damage suits against state officials in their official
capacity are deemed to be suits against the state,26 and are therefore not
actionable in federal court without the state's consent.
A taxpayer is also prohibited from suing a state tax official in her indi-
vidual capacity for damages in federal district court.2 7 In Fair Assessment
in Real Estate Association v. McNary,28 the Supreme Court held that a
20. Some commentators have suggested that the phrase "plain, speedy and efficient" is syno-
nomous with "adequate." See, e.g., P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART
AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 979 (2d ed. 1973). For a
discussion of whether the state court remedy is "plain, speedy and efficient" if it does not provide a
taxpayer with the remedies available under § 1983, see infra note 33.
21. See, e.g., Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981) (taxpayer's § 1983 claim in
federal court held improper because state offered plain, speedy and efficient remedy).
22. The Tax Injunction Act may not be circumvented by resorting to the fiction used in Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (allowing equitable action against state official notwithstanding that such
suit could not be maintained against state directly), to challenge state taxation in federal court. See,
e.g., Rosewell, 450 U.S. 503.
23. Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment does not address suits against a state by its own
citizens, the Supreme Court has ruled that the Eleventh Amendment's proscription encompasses such
suits. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
24. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
25. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
26. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945) (suit to recover money
against state department of treasury held to be suit against state); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436
(1900) (suit against state treasurer in his official capacity held to be suit against state). See generally
Note, Jurisdiction to Enforce Federal Statutes Regulating State Taxation: The Eleventh Amend-
ment-Section 1341 Imbroglio, 70 YALE L.J. 636 (1961) (discussing Eleventh Amendment and Tax
Injunction Act as bars to federal court actions challenging state taxation).
27. For a discussion of whether a state tax § 1983 suit should properly be brought against an
official in her individual or official capacity, see infra text accompanying notes 98-102.
28. 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
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taxpayer challenging the constitutionality of a state tax official's conduct
may not maintain an individual-capacity section 1983 damages action in
federal court. 29 The McNary Court stated that a suit against a state tax
official would have a chilling effect on that official's performance of her
duties, and would therefore disrupt the state's tax collection efforts.30 Re-
lying on the principle of comity,3 the Court held that a federal district
court should refuse jurisdiction over such a taxpayer suit if "a plain, ade-
quate, and complete remedy"3' 2 is available to the taxpayer under state
law.33 The McNary Court repeatedly noted that the federal district courts
should avoid interfering with state taxation whenever possible.34
Given that federal courts cannot entertain state tax section 1983 claims
and that the remedies under that section are needed to ensure the protec-
tion of taxpayers' rights, the assured availability of state courts as fora for
these claims is of paramount importance. Part II will assess the obligation
29. Id. at 113-14.
30. Id. at 115.
31. The McNary Court did not decide whether the action was also barred by the Tax Injunction
Act. Id. at 107.
32. The Court could "discern no significant difference. . . between remedies which are 'plain,
adequate, and complete'. . . and those which are 'plain, speedy and efficient,' within the meaning of
the [Tax Injunction Act]." Id. at 116 n.8.
33. Id. at 116. Thus, the McNary decision clearly leaves the federal courts open to one specific
class of state tax claims: those brought where a "plain, adequate, and complete" remedy is not availa-
ble under state law. Similarly, the Tax Injunction Act leaves the federal courts open if the taxpayer
does not have a "plain, speedy and efficient" remedy in state court. See supra note 15. Left undecided
is whether the taxpayer's "adequate" remedies must include those available under §§ 1983 and 1988.
If the state court must provide these remedies, then a taxpayer in a state whose courts refuse to
entertain § 1983 claims may assert his claim in federal court.
At least one circuit, however, has held that even after a state court has refused to hear a taxpayer's§ 1983 claim, the taxpayer cannot assert that claim in federal court. See Redd v. Lambert, 674 F.2d
1032 (5th Cir. 1982). Moreover, even if such a claim were allowed in federal court, other reasons
support a requirement that state courts entertain state tax § 1983 actions. First, a federal court could
hear the taxpayer's § 1983 claim only after a state court had refused to entertain it. Thus, to have a §
1983 claim adjudicated, a taxpayer would have to incur the costs of litigating his claim in both state
and federal court. The uncertainty of recovery in this time-consuming and expensive process might
deter risk-averse taxpayers from asserting meritorious claims. Although subsequent taxpayers in a
given state might be allowed to proceed directly to federal court if the appropriate state courts had
refused to hear previous state tax § 1983 claims, it is conceivable that each taxpayer would have to be
turned away by the state courts before he would be allowed to proceed in federal court. Moreover, due
to geographic, time, and financial constraints, the state court may for all practical purposes be the
only forum available to many § 1983 claimants. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
34. See 454 U.S. at 102, 108, 111. McNary, which involved a tax assessment challenge, specifi-
cally left open the question whether comity also bars a federal district court from entertaining a facial
attack on a tax statute. Id. at 107 n.4. This question, however, seems moot. Such a facial attack is
barred, if not by the principle of comity, then certainly by the Eleventh Amendment and the Tax
Injunction Act. See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text. The only action not foreclosed is a suit
by a taxpayer against a state tax official in her individual capacity, seeking damages to remedy that
official's enforcement of an unconstitutional state tax statute. Unless enforcement of the statute in
question violated a clearly established constitutional right, however, the official would be immune
from such a suit. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (official "not charged with predicting the future course of constitutional law").
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of state courts to entertain section 1983 claims generally, and Part III will
focus on state tax section 1983 claims specifically.
II. THE ROLE OF STATE COURTS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF
SECTION 1983 CLAIMS IN GENERAL
In Martinez v. California,35 the Supreme Court ruled that state courts
possess concurrent jurisdiction over claims brought under section 1983.36
The Court has, however, left open the question whether state courts are
required to entertain these claims.37 Most state courts have freely accepted
jurisdiction over section 1983 and have entertained claims brought under
that section.38 Several states have even recognized an obligation on the
35. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
36. Id. at 283 n.7 ("We note that the California courts accepted jurisdiction of this [§ 1983] claim.
That exercise of jurisdiction appears to be consistent with the general rule [of Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386, 391 (1947)]."). The Court reaffirmed the Martinez holding in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,
3 n.1 (1980) ("Any doubt that state courts may also entertain [§ 19831 actions was dispelled by
Martinez .... There, while reserving the question whether state courts are obligated to entertain
§ 1983 actions, we held that Congress has not barred them from doing so.") (emphasis in original).
For a discussion of the evolution of § 1983 and its jurisdictional provision, see Note, The Enforce-
ability and Proper Implementation of § 1983 and the Attorney's Fees Awards Act in State Courts,
20 ARiz. L. REv. 743, 746-53 (1978).
37. See Martinez, 444 U.S. at 283 n.7 ("We have never considered, however, the question
whether a State must entertain a claim under § 1983.") (emphasis in original); see also Thiboutot,
448 U.S. at 3 n.1 (noting that Martinez Court had reserved question whether state courts must enter-
tain § 1983 actions).
38. Terrell v. City of Bessemer, 406 So. 2d 337, 340 (Ala. 1981); Fairbanks Correctional Center
Inmates v. Williamson, 600 P.2d 743, 747 (Alaska 1979); New Times, Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Re-
gents, 110 Ariz. 367, 374, 519 P.2d 169, 176 (1974) (en banc); Burden v. Hayden, 275 Ark. 93, 96,
627 S.W.2d 555, 557 (1982); Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d 518, 521-23, 531 P.2d 772, 774-75, 119
Cal. Rptr. 204, 206-07 (1975) (en bane); Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455, 460 n.2 (Colo. 1981) (en
banc), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 430 (1982); Vason v. Carrano, 31 Conn. Supp. 338, 338, 330 A.2d
98, 98-99 (Super. Ct. 1974); Slawik v. State, 480 A.2d 636, 640 (Del. 1984); Long v. District of
Columbia, 469 F.2d 927, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Davis v. City of Roswell, 250 Ga. 8, 9, 295 S.E.2d
317, 318-19 (1982); Alberty v. Daniel, 25 Ill. App. 3d 291, 294-95, 323 N.E.2d 110, 113-14 (1974);
Colvin v. Bowen, 399 N.E.2d 835, 837-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); Blessum v. Howard County Bd. of
Supervisors, 295 N.W.2d 836, 844 (Iowa 1980); Cooper v. Hutchinson Police Dep't, 6 Kan. App. 2d
806, 807-08, 636 P.2d 184, 185-86 (1981); Scott v. Campbell County Bd. of Educ., 618 S.W.2d 589,
590 (Ky. 1981); Ricard v. State, 390 So. 2d 882, 883-84 (La. 1980); Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d
230, 235 (Me. 1979), affd sub nom. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980); De Bleecker v. Mont-
gomery County, 48 Md. App. 455, 459, 427 A.2d 1075, 1077 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 292
Md. 498, 438 A.2d 1348 (1982); Santana v. Registrars of Voters, 384 Mass. 487, 492, 425 N.E.2d
745, 749 (1981); Dickerson v. Warden, Marquette Prison, 99 Mich. App. 630, 634, 298 N.W.2d 841,
843 (1980); Sweeney v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 368 N.W.2d 288, 291-92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985);
Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310, 315-16 (Mo. 1978) (en bane),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); MBC, Inc. v. Engel, 119 N.H. 8, 10, 397 A.2d 636, 637 (1979);
Endress v. Brookdale Community College, 144 N.J. Super. 109, 132, 364 A.2d 1080, 1092 (1976);
Gomez v. Board of Educ., 85 N.M. 708, 710-11, 516 P.2d 679, 681-82 (1973); Felder v. Foster, 107
Misc. 2d 782, 783-84, 436 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Kristensen v. Strinden, 343 N.W.2d
67, 69-71 (N.D. 1983); Jackson v. Kurtz, 65 Ohio App. 2d 152, 156-57, 416 N.E.2d 1064, 1067
(1979); Powell v. Seay, 553 P.2d 161, 164 (Okla. 1976); Rosacker v. Multnomah County, 43 Or.
App. 583, 587, 603 P.2d 1216, 1218 (1979); Commonwealth ex rel. Saunders v. Creamer, 464 Pa. 2,
4 n.3, 345 A.2d 702, 703 n.3 (1975); Carvalho v. Coletta, 457 A.2d 614, 617 (R.I. 1983); Beauregard
v. City of St. Albans, 141 Vt. 624, 626-27, 450 A.2d 1148, 1149 (1982); Kuehn v. Renton School
Dist. No. 403, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 597-98, 694 P.2d 1078, 1080 (1985) (en banc); Harrah v. Lever-
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part of courts in their state to entertain such actions. 9 A minority of state
courts, however, have refused to entertain section 1983 claims. 40 This
Note argues that these refusals are based on a misconception of the role of
state courts in the federal scheme and are therefore improper. State courts
must entertain federal causes of action over which they have jurisdiction,
and section 1983 actions are no exception to this rule.
A. The Obligation of State Courts to Entertain Federal Causes of
Action
The obligation of state courts to entertain federal causes of action is
well established. In Testa v. Katt,4 1 the Supreme Court broadly ruled that
a state court generally is not free to deny the enforcement of a valid fed-
eral claim if that court has "jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under
ette, 271 S.E.2d 322, 332 (W. Va. 1980); Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 496-97, 254 N.W.2d 704,
712 (1977); Board of Trustees v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009, 1017 (Wyo. 1978).
39. See Terrell v. City of Bessemer, 406 So. 2d at 340 ("[Clourts of this state must accept jurisdic-
tion over claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, if a § 1983 plaintiff selects a state court as his
forum."); Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d at 523, 531 P.2d at 775, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 207 (In § 1983
cases "'the existence of [concurrent] jurisdiction creates the duty to exercise it.' ") (quoting Gerry of
Cal. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 119, 122, 194 P.2d 689, 692 (1948)); Colvin v. Bowen, 399
N.E.2d at 837 ("[Sltate courts of general jurisdiction are not free to deny enforcement of claims
growing out of a valid federal statute such as § 1983."); Felder v. Foster, 107 Misc. 2d at 783-84, 436
N.Y.S.2d at 677 ("This court has jurisdiction to entertain all proceedings brought under sections 1983
and 1988 . . . and must exercise that jurisdiction when such a proceeding is properly before it
.... ") (citations omitted); Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d at 496-97, 254 N.W.2d at 712 ("[Clourts of
this state have jurisdiction to hear and decide sec. 1983 cases. In addition, they have an affirmative
obligation under the Constitution of the United States to take jurisdiction .... ").
40. See City of North Miami v. Schy, 408 So. 2d 670, 670 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (because
U.S. Supreme Court has not held that state courts must entertain § 1983 actions, lower state court
could refuse to hear such claim); Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 505, 224 S.E.2d 370, 374 (1976)
(taxpayer may not circumvent established state procedures for equalizing tax assessments by asserting
§ 1983 claim); State Tax Comm'n v. Fondren, 387 So. 2d 712, 723 (Miss. 1980) (en banc) (because
state tax § 1983 claim may not be litigated in federal court, it likewise may not be litigated in state
court), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981); Stufflebaum v. Panethiere, 691 S.W.2d 271, 272 (Mo.
1985) (en banc) (state tax § 1983 claim held improper because state law provided plain, adequate,
and complete remedy); Strain v. Baryla, No. TSB-H-84(44)S (N.Y. State Tax Comm'n June 1,
1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, NYtax file) (Tax Injunction Act bars courts, including
state courts, from entertaining § 1983 claims challenging state taxation); Johnston v. Gaston County,
71 N.C. App. 707, 712-13, 323 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1984) (state tax § 1983 claim held improper be-
cause state law provided plain, adequate, and complete remedy), review denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329
S.E.2d 392 (1985); Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 281 S.C. 492, 497, 316 S.E.2d 386,
388-89 (1984) (taxpayer may not circumvent state remedies by invoking § 1983), affd by an equally
divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam); Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25, 31-35,
442 S.W.2d 248, 250-52 (1969) (arguing that it would be illogical for state courts to entertain § 1983
claims).
In several of these cases, the § 1983 claimant was challenging allegedly unconstitutional state taxa-
tion. For a discussion of the propriety of state court refusals to entertain state tax § 1983 claims, see
infra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
41. 330 U.S. 386 (1947). Testa involved a Rhode Island court's refusal to entertain an action
brought under the federal Emergency Price Control Act. The refusal was premised on the belief that
the Act was a penal law, and that the courts of Rhode Island were not obligated to enforce the penal
laws of another sovereign.
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established local law" to adjudicate similar actions.42 The Court stated
that the assumption that state courts do not have to entertain federal
causes of action "flies in the face of the fact that the States of the Union
constitute a nation [and] disregards the purpose and effect of [the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution]."4
Two earlier Supreme Court decisions requiring state courts to entertain
actions under the Federal Employers Liability Act foreshadowed the
Testa holding." The Court in Mondou v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad,45 dismissed as "quite inadmissible" the contention
that a state court could refuse to entertain a federal cause of action if the
federal law in question conflicted with the policy of the state.4 The Court
held that Congress, acting under the supremacy clause, had preempted
any conflicting state policy.4 7 In addressing the assertion that enforcing
federal causes of action would unduly burden state courts, the Court noted
that "[w]e are not disposed to believe that the exercise of jurisdiction by
the state courts will be attended by any appreciable inconvenience or con-
42. Id. at 394.
43. Id. at 389. The supremacy clause provides in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
In deciding Testa, a decision based squarely on the supremacy clause, the Court relied heavily on
its earlier interpretation of that clause in Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876) (assignee in
bankruptcy allowed to bring action in state court to recover from judgment suffered by bankrupt party
which was obtained in violation of federal bankruptcy law). Although the question presented in Claf-
lin was not whether a state court must entertain a federal cause of action, but rather whether it could
do so, the Court's broad holding laid the foundation for the rule that state courts are obligated to
entertain federal causes of action, a proposition later articulated explicitly in Testa. The Claflin
Court declared:
[R]ights. . .acquired under the laws of the United States, may be prosecuted in the United
States courts, or in the State courts, competent to decide rights of the like character and class
.... The fact that a State court derives its existence and functions from the State laws is no
reason why it should not afford relief; because it is subject also to the laws of the United
States, and is just as much bound to recognize these as operative within the State as it is to
recognize the State laws.
Id. at 136-37.
44. For a discussion of cases brought in state courts under the Federal Employers Liability Act,
see Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Court, 75 Mxcii. L. Rxv.
311, 348-59 (1976).
45. 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
46. Id. at 57.
47. The Mondou Court stated:
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in harmony with the policy of the State, and
therefore that the courts of the State are free to decline jurisdiction, is quite inadmissible,
because it presupposes what in legal contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the
exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution, adopted that act, it spoke for all the
people and all the States, and thereby established a policy for all. That policy is as much the
policy of [the state] as if the act had emanated from its own legislature, and should be
respected accordingly in the courts of the State.
Id.
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fusion; but, be this as it may, it affords no reason for declining a jurisdic-
tion conferred by law.""8 In McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Rail-
way,49 the Court reaffirmed the rule established in Mondou, and went on
to announce that "[a] state may not discriminate against rights arising
under federal laws." '50
Testa, Mondou, and McKnett firmly establish two principles: State
courts are obligated to entertain federal causes of action whenever their
jurisdiction is adequate to adjudicate similar claims, and state courts may
not discriminate against federal causes of action. Under these rules, a state
court may refuse to entertain a federal cause of action only if it has a
neutral procedural or jurisdictional reason for so doing.51 To be neutral, a
state court's reason for refusing to entertain a federal action must apply
equally to all actions, whether provided by state or federal law.
B. Section 1983 Actions in State Court
Section 1983 claims should not be exempted from the requirement that
Testa imposes on state courts to entertain federal causes of action. Al-
though on two occasions the Supreme Court has specifically reserved the
question whether state courts are required to entertain section 1983 ac-
tions,52 the Court has implied th'at they must.53 This Section will consider
and reject two possible justifications for treating section 1983 claims dif-
48. Id. at 58. The Court has recently reaffirmed that Congress may place the burden of enforcing
a federal law upon a branch of state government. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-61(1982). See generally Brilmayer & Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for
Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L.
REV. 819, 824-29, 838-40 (1983) (discussing duties of state courts in adjudicating federal claims).
49. 292 U.S. 230 (1934).
50. Id. at 234. See generally Solimine, Adjudication of Federal Civil Rights Actions in Ohio
Courts, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 39, 52-54 (1983) (discussing rule that state courts may not discrimi-
nate against federal causes of action).
51. For three cases in which the Supreme Court has held that the state was justified in refusing to
entertain a federal cause of action due to a neutral procedural or jurisdictional rule, see Missouri ex
rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (state court not prohibited from applying stateforum non conveniens rule to federal causes of action); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (state
court's dismissal of federal cause of action held proper because action had been asserted in city court
which had no jurisdiction over matter in question); Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S.
377 (1929) (upholding state court's dismissal of federal action pursuant to New York law denying
non-residents right to sue foreign corporations in New York courts, because rule in question applied
equally to both state and federal causes of action). For a discussion of these cases, see Redish &
Muench, supra note 44, at 352-54; Note, Amenability of States to Section 1983 Suits: Reexamining
Quern v. Jordan, 62 B.U.L. REV. 731, 764-66 (1982).
52. The Court reserved the question in both Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7
(1980), and Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980). See supra note 37.
53. The language used in Martinez strongly implies that state courts must entertain § 1983 ac-
tions: "We note that where the same type of claim, if arising under state law, would be enforced in
the state courts, the state courts are generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim." 444
U.S. at 283 n.7 (citing Testa, 330 U.S. at 394).
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ferently from other federal causes of action, and will conclude that state
courts must entertain section 1983 claims.
1. The "Mistrust" Justification
At least one state court has asserted that it would be illogical to require
state courts to entertain section 1983 actions in light of the fact that sec-
tion 1983 was originally enacted precisely because Congress mistrusted
these courts. 54 Support for the propositions that the 1871 Congress, which
enacted section 1983, was creating a cause of action in federal court and
that the 1871 Congress would not have expected state courts to be re-
quired to entertain these claims can be mustered from portions of the leg-
islative history of section 198355 and from language in several Supreme
Court decisions. 58 When taken in proper context, however, none of these
passages support the contention that state courts should be free to refuse
to enforce section 1983. Indeed, other portions of the legislative history
57
and other Supreme Court decisions examining that history58 suggest the
opposite conclusion, that state courts are obligated to entertain section
1983 actions.
The broad purpose of section 1983 supports the proposition that state
courts must entertain these claims. Section 1983 was enacted to ensure the
protection of federal rights,59 and the provision of a federal forum was
54. See Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25, 35, 442 S.W.2d 248, 252 (1969) ("[I1t would be
illogical indeed to hold that a State court should enforce, or is required to enforce, an alleged cause of
action which owes its very existence to congressional recognition of reluctance or refusal of State
Courts to act.").
55.
This section gives to any person who may have been injured in any of his rights, privileges,
or immunities of person or property, a civil action for damages against the wrongdoer in the
Federal courts . . . . It is a covert attempt to transfer another large portion of jurisdiction
from the State tribunals, to which it of right belongs, to those of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., app. 50 (1871) (statement of Rep. Kerr discussing precursor of
§ 1983), reprinted in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 178-79 (1961).
56. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) ("The very purpose of § 1983 was to
interpose the federal courts between the States and the people .... "); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at
180 ("It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in
federal courts ... .
57.
I do not say that this section gives to the Federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. I do not
suppose that it is so understood. It leaves it, I presume, in the option of the person who
imagines himself to be injured to sue in the State court or in the Federal court ....
CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 1st Sess., app. 216 (1871) (statement of Sen. Thurman discussing precur-
sor of § 1983), reprinted in Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 507 (1982).
58. See, e.g., Patsy, 457 U.S. at 506 ("[Mlany legislators interpreted [§ 1983] to provide dual or
concurrent forums in the state and federal system, enabling the plaintiff to choose the forum in which
to seek relief."); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 99 (1980) (By enacting § 1983, "Congress was
adding to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, not subtracting from that of the state courts.").
59. State courts routinely adjudicate claims implicating federal rights. The typical criminal case
almost always involves the protection of federal rights, and state judges routinely preside over these
matters. Moreover, "tilt denigrates the judges who serve on the state courts to suggest that they will
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only a means to achieve that end, not an end in itself. Ensuring a state
court option only strengthens the commitment to protecting federal rights.
The federal courts will, of course, continue to entertain section 1983 ac-
tions, 0 but state courts will provide an alternative forum for those claim-
ants who believe that state courts will better protect their federal rights.61
Testa imposes a duty on state courts to entertain federal causes of ac-
tion.62 Although section 1983 is a remedial provision and creates no new
rights, 3 this characterization does not alter the duty of state courts. State
courts are obligated under the supremacy clause to protect federal rights;
the remedies under section 1983 and section 1988" provide the means of
ensuring that deprivations of federal rights do not go unvindicated. Al-
lowing state courts to refuse to entertain section 1983 actions would "rat-
ify adherence to the very evil the civil rights acts were designed to obvi-
ate-the refusal of state courts and officers to vindicate civil rights
afforded by the Constitution of the United States."6
2. The "Optional Jurisdiction" Justification
The jurisdictional grant for section 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1343,66 provides
only for "original" jurisdiction for federal district courts and makes no
not enforce the supreme law of the land." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3146
n.2 (1985). But see Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. Rxv. 1105 (1977) (arguing that state
courts are inferior at protecting federal rights).
60. There are, however, a number of cases-most notably state tax actions-in which the federal
courts will not be available. See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
61. It would not be proper for a state court to refuse to entertain a § 1983 action because the state
court believed it would not protect the claimant's federal rights as well as a federal court. Rather, the
claimant is the party most suited to choose the forum that will best protect his rights. The United
States Supreme Court is of course available to monitor the holdings of state courts to ensure that these
courts are properly protecting claimants' federal rights. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1982).
62. 330 U.S. at 394.
63. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-18 (1979).
64. When Congress enacted § 1988, it was clear that the attorney's fees provided under that
section would be available in state court. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980). At that time,
state courts were the only potential fora for certain § 1983 actions because Congress had not removed
the $10,000 minimum amount in controversy requirement for federal court jurisdiction over federal
claims, including those asserted under § 1983. Id. at 11 n.12. If Congress intended § 1988 to be
applied consistently and to benefit those most in need of its protections-claimants with monetary
disincentives to vindicating their federal rights-then it is logical to assume that Congress expected
state courts to entertain actions involving § 1988, such as those brought under § 1983.
65. Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 489 n.2, 254 N.W.2d 704, 709 n.2 (1977).
66. See Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 540, 545 (1972) (recognizing § 1343 as
jurisdictional grant for § 1983 claims challenging deprivations of constitutional rights). Section 1343
provides in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized by law
to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Consti-
tution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States ....
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explicit reference to state courts. As a result, at least one commentator has
suggested that although state courts may have jurisdiction over section
1983 actions, they may opt to refuse to exercise this jurisdiction. 7 The
supremacy clause and Mondou, however, counsel against such a conclu-
sion. Under the supremacy clause, state judges are required to uphold the
federal Constitution and federal laws. Section 1983 is such a law, encom-
passing both federal constitutional and statutory rights. Moreover, the
Mondou Court stated that "[tihe existence of. . .jurisdiction creates an
implication of duty to exercise it." 68 State courts have jurisdiction over
section 1983; 9 the logic of Mondou therefore compels the conclusion that
they must exercise it.70
The Supreme Court's decision in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park1
also belies the contention that because section 1983's jurisdictional grant,
section 1343, does not mention state courts, those courts are not required
to entertain section 1983 actions. Sullivan involved an action brought in a
Virginia state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1982,7' a federal law also having
section 1343 as its jurisdictional provision. The Sullivan Court ruled
that if the Virginia court's jurisdiction were adequate to hear similar state
claims and to grant relief similar to that requested under section 1982,
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982). For a discussion of § 1343 as the jurisdictional grant for § 1983 actions
alleging a denial of federal statutory rights, see Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S.
600.
67. See Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Re-
vised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 187, 207 (requiring state courts to entertain federal causes of
action places burden on these courts, and as such, "[i]n the absence of a declaration by Congress that
state courts must enforce rights that Congress has created, there appears to be no substantial reason
why the Supreme Court should impose such an obligation"). Contra Redish & Muench, supra note
44, at 346-47; Note, supra note 51, at 771-72. Although Dean Sandalow does not examine § 1983
specifically, the cause of action provided by that section is paradigmatic of the congressionally-created
rights of action he does examine.
68. 223 U.S. at 58. The Mondou Court made no reference to the source of jurisdiction; it referred
only to its existence. Indeed, the Federal Employers Liability Act, the federal statute at issue in
Mondou, did not originally mention whether state courts would have jurisdiction over matters arising
under the Act. A subsequent amendment noted the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts, but the
Supreme Court held that this amendment "instead of granting jurisdiction to the state courts, presup-
poses that they already possessed it [under the general federal question statute]." Id. at 56.
69. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
70. If state courts were allowed to refuse to entertain a federal cause of action unless Congress
specifically enlisted them for the enforcement of the action, those courts would be free to discriminate
against federal causes of action by capriciously accepting or rejecting jurisdiction over them. Although
such discrimination is proscribed by McKnett, 292 U.S. at 234, congressional silence would be tanta-
mount to a state court license to discriminate. Because Congress intends for the laws that it enacts to
be enforced consistently, state courts should be given discretion to decide whether to entertain a federal
cause of action only if Congress specifically provides for such discretion.
71. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
72. Section 1982 provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).
73. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412 n.1 (1968).
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then that court could not refuse to entertain the claimant's section 1982
action.7' The Court so decided notwithstanding that section 1343 does not
even mention state courts, much less specifically enlist their help.
C. The Need for Access to State Courts Even When Federal Courts Are
Available
Although access to state courts is of particular importance to taxpayers
asserting section 1983 actions because they are foreclosed from proceeding
in federal courts,7 5 the availability of state courts is also important for
other section 1983 claimants. Often, due to geographic," time, or financial
constraints,77 a state court is the only practical forum available to a claim-
ant asserting a section 1983 action. Moreover, because in some instances a
state court will be the only forum having jurisdiction over the entire con-
troversy and all parties involved, 8 judicial economy can be served only if
state courts are open to section 1983 claims.
II. STATE COURTS AND STATE TAX SECTION 1983 CLAIMS
Despite their obligation to entertain section 1983 actions generally,
most state courts have mistakenly refused to hear state tax section 1983
claims .7  After dispelling the broad notion that state courts may not enter-
74. "[Under § 1982] a federal court has power to fashion an effective equitable remedy....
That federal remedy for the protection of a federal right is available in the state court, if that court is
empowered to grant injunctive relief generally .... " 396 U.S. at 238 (citation omitted); cf Testa,
330 U.S. at 394 (state court must entertain federal cause of action if it has jurisdiction "adequate and
appropriate under established local law" to adjudicate similar state law claims).
75. See supra notes 14-34 and accompanying text.
76. The availability of a state forum would be especially helpful for residents of the western
states, where the nearest federal court might be hundreds of miles away but a state court would never
be farther away than the county seat. See New Times, Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 20 Ariz. App.
422, 427, 513 P.2d 960, 965 (1973) ("[Mlany citizens of this state, because of their geographical
residence, would be inconvenienced if they were forced to litigate in a federal, rather than a state,
court."), vacated, 110 Ariz. 367, 519 P.2d 169 (1974).
77. While the delay is usually longer in state court than in federal court, c. Neubrne, supra
note 59, at 1122 (noting that most state courts have a larger caseload burden than their federal coun-
terparts), the opposite is true in some jurisdictions. Telephone interview with Mary Elsner, Senior
Research Associate, Center for State Courts (Mar. 4, 1985). Moreover, the expense of litigating a
matter is usually higher in federal than state court. Id.
78. A federal court hearing a federal claim or a diversity claim does not have ancillary jurisdiction
over a non-diverse party against whom a non-federal claim is being asserted, even if the claim arises
out of the same nucleus of operative facts that generated the claim over which the court does have
proper jurisdiction. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). Thus, if a
claimant has a § 1983 action against one party and a state-provided cause of action against another
non-diverse party, and both claims arise out of a common nucleus of operative facts, the federal court
will not be able to entertain the second cause of action. See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1
(1976). A state court would, however, be able to entertain both claims.
79. See Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 505, 224 S.E.2d 370, 374 (1976) (taxpayer may not
circumvent state procedures by asserting § 1983 claim); State Tax Comm'n v. Fondren, 387 So. 2d
712, 723 (Miss. 1980) (en banc) (because state tax § 1983 claim may not be litigated in federal court,
it likewise may not be litigated in state court), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981); Stufflebaum v.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 95: 414, 1985
tain state tax section 1983 actions for the same reasons that federal courts
may not, Part III will rebut the other justifications proferred by state
courts for refusing to hear these actions and will conclude that state courts
must entertain state tax section 1983 claims. 80
A. The Flaw in the Fondren Reasoning
State taxation has always been an area in which the federal courts have
granted great deference to the states and their courts,81 but this policy of
federal court noninterference with state taxation should not be confused
with or subsumed within a policy of complete federal noninterference. In
exercising their taxing power, the states must stay within the bounds of
the federal Constitution, and Congress may enact laws such as section
1983 to ensure that the states do not overstep these limits.
In State Tax Commission v. Fondren,2 the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi was confronted with the question whether section 1983 provides a
Panethiere, 691 S.W.2d 271, 272 (Mo. 1985) (en bane) (state tax § 1983 claim held improper because
state law provided plain, adequate, and complete remedy and thus complied with requirements of
McNary); Strain v. Baryla, No. TSB-H-84(44)S (N.Y. State Tax Comm'n June 1, 1984) (available
on LEXIS, States library, NYtax file) (Tax Injunction Act bars courts, including state courts, from
entertaining § 1983 claims challenging state taxation); Johnston v. Gaston County, 71 N.C. App. 707,
712-13, 323 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1984) (state tax § 1983 claim held improper because state law provided
plain, adequate, and complete remedy and thus complied with requirements of McNary), review de-
nied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d, 392 (1985); Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 281 S.C. 492,
497, 316 S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1984) (taxpayer may not circumvent state remedies by invoking §
1983), affld by an equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam). But see Beverly Bank
v. Board of Review, 117 Ill. App. 3d 656, 664-65, 453 N.E.2d 96, 102 (1983) (state court entertained
state tax § 1983 claim), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2153 (1984); Dutoit v. Board of County Comm'rs,
233 Kan. 995, 1004-06, 667 P.2d 879, 888-90 (1983) (same); Holden Arboretum v. City of Kirk-
land, No. 9-224 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 1984) (available on LEXIS, States library, Ohio file)
(same).
At least two state courts that have accepted jurisdiction over non-tax § 1983 claims have refused to
entertain state tax § 1983 actions. Compare Davis v. City of Roswell, 250 Ga. 8, 295 S.E.2d 317
(1982) (accepting jurisdiction over non-tax § 1983 claim) and Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310 (Mo. 1978) (en banc) (same), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979) with
Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 224 S.E.2d 370 (refusing to entertain taxpayer's § 1983 claim) and
Stufflebaum v. Panethiere, 691 S.W.2d 271 (same). The refusal in Backus may have been proper
given that state courts may be allowed to require state tax § 1983 claimants to exhaust state-provided
administrative remedies before asserting a § 1983 claim. See infra note 94. The Backus court, how-
ever, did not make clear whether it was relying on these grounds.
80. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard arguments in a case that presented the
question whether state courts must entertain state tax § 1983 claims. Spencer v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 105 S. Ct. 242 (1984). The Court, however, was equally divided and rendered no opinion in
the case. 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam) (affirming refusal by South Carolina court to entertain
state tax § 1983 claim).
81. See Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 108, 110 (1871) (discussing federal equity
jurisdiction over state tax matters and stating- "It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely
to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all
of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as
possible."); accord California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 410 n.23 (1982) (discussing
reluctance of federal courts to interfere with state taxation and repeating above language from Dows).
82. 387 So. 2d 712 (Miss. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981).
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remedy for unconstitutional taxation. The court concluded: "[The state
tax] section 1983 cause of action must fail in the state court because it
would have failed if it had been filed . . . in federal court." ' Although
the Fondren court correctly determined that a federal court could not
have considered the state tax section 1983 claim, the court mistakenly con-
flated the unavailability of a federal forum into a broader unavailability of
section 1983 as a remedy for unconstitutional taxation."' The general pol-
icy of federal court noninterference with state taxation forecloses taxpay-
ers from asserting section 1983 actions in federal court; it does not prevent
them from pursuing these same remedies in state court. Neither the Elev-
enth Amendment, the Tax Injunction Act, nor the principle of comity af-
fect th6 actionability of a state tax section 1983 claim in state court, nor do
they imply any state immunity from federal interference with state
taxation.
The Eleventh Amendment, by its plain language, only addresses the
amenability of states to suits in federal court; it does not affect the amena-
bility of states to actions-such as those brought under section 1983-that
are asserted in state court.8 5 Likewise, the Tax Injunction Act does not
bar taxpayers from pursuing federal remedies in state courts.8 6 By its
terms, the Act affects only the jurisdiction of the federal district courts.8 7
The Tax Injunction Act was passed to limit federal court interference
83. Id. at 723.
84. In ruling that a state court need not entertain a state tax § 1983 claim, the Fondren court
relied heavily on the Tax Injunction Act. For analytical purposes, however, this Note will evaluate a
broader rationale implicit in Fondren: because state tax § 1983 claims are not actionable in federal
court, they may not be asserted in state court either.
85. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980) ("No Eleventh Amendment question is
present. . . where an action is brought in a state court since the Amendment, by its terms, restrains
only '[t]he Judicial power of the United States."); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v.
Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 293-94 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring)
(discussing Eleventh Amendment and stating: "The issue is not the general immunity of the States
from private suit-a question of the common law-but merely the susceptibility of the States to suit
before federal tribunals.").
86. See Strain v. Baryla, No. TSB-H-84(44)S (N.Y. State Tax Comm'n June 1, 1984) (available
on LEXIS, States library, NYtax file) (mistakenly relying on fact that Tax Injunction Act precludes
federal courts from entertaining state tax § 1983 claims in ruling that these claims cannot be pursued
in state court).
87. The Tax Injunction Act was always referred to as a bill "to amend. . . the Judicial Code
• ..with respect to the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States over suits relating to the
collection of State taxes." 81 CONG. REc. 1271 (1937). The text of the Act, which refers only to the
federal district courts, makes clear that it is merely a jurisdiction-shifting provision. See supra note 15.
The legislative history and narrow focus of the Tax Injunction Act also make dear that the Act was
not a congressional preemption of the remedies provided by § 1983 in the area of state taxation. Cf.
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (comprehen-
sive congressional remedial provision in particular field supplants § 1983 in that area).
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with state taxation"8 and merely transfers a class of claims, including fed-
erally-provided causes of action, from federal to state court. 9
A persuasive argument can be made that the Tax Injunction Act was
enacted, at least in part, to protect state tax revenues by ensuring that
individuals pay their taxes before litigating their controversy.9 0 Allowing
state tax section 1983 claims, and indeed, requiring state courts to enter-
tain them, arguably could undermine this goal. The argument is that be-
cause a section 1983 claimant is not generally required to exhaust his
administrative remedies,9 1 that claimant can proceed directly to state
court, and because the section 1983 action is a federal action, state re-
quirements-such as the requirement that a claimant pay the tax prior to
litigating his claim-would not control.
A state tax section 1983 cause of action will not, however, jeopardize
the integrity of states' tax systems. In the first place, only a taxpayer de-
prived of a federal constitutional right92 will be able to assert a successful
section 1983 action; most tax challenges lack this crucial element.9 3 Sec-
ond, because the state tax section 1983 action lies in state court, rather
than in federal court where no exhaustion is required, state courts may be
able to require a taxpayer to exhaust state administrative remedies before
88. Congress enacted the Tax Injunction Act for three reasons. First, Congress wanted to curtail
the federal district court's burgeoning practice of enjoining state tax collection. As a result of these
injunctions, large corporations had often been able to withhold state taxes "in such vast amounts and
for such long periods as to disrupt State and county finances, and thus make it possible for such
corporations to determine for themselves the amount of taxes they [would] pay." 81 CONG. REc. 1416
(1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone).
Second, Congress wanted to eliminate discrimination against residents of the state imposing the tax.
As a result of federal diversity jurisdiction, non-resident citizens and corporations had a choice be-
tween state and federal court, but residents of the forum state were usually compelled to litigate their
controversy in state court. Id. at 1416-17.
Third, Congress sought to return control over state tax matters to state courts. Id. There is, how-
ever, no evidence that Congress was attempting to free the states from the requirements of the Consti-
tution and the laws enacted by Congress to protect constitutional rights.
89. "The Tax Injunction Act embodied Congress' decision to transfer jurisdiction over a class of
substantive federal claims from the federal district courts to the state courts . . . ." Rosewell v.
LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 515 n.19 (1981); see also California v. Grace Brethren Church,
457 U.S. at 411 ("Congress' intent in enacting the Tax Injunction Act was to preventfederal-court
interference with the assessment and collection of state taxes") (emphasis added).
90. See 81 CONG. REc. 1415-17 (1937) (remarks of Sen. Bone).
91. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (exhaustion of state administrative reme-
dies not required before proceeding with § 1983 action in federal court).
92. See, e.g., Shutt v. Moore, 26 Wash. App. 450, 453, 613 P.2d 1188, 1190 (1980) (conclusory
allegations of violations of federal rights are not sufficient to state claim under § 1983; rather, "plain-
tiff must allege facts establishing that specific constitutional rights have been violated").
93. A taxpayer claiming that he was mistakenly overtaxed-and thus, deprived of his property
without due process-will not be allowed to bring a § 1983 action prior to the exhaustion of his state-
provided administrative and judicial remedies. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (establish-
ing exhaustion-like requirement for claimants asserting due process § 1983 actions); see also 405 Co.
v. State, 118 Misc. 2d 305, 308-09, 460 N.Y.S.2d 455, 458 (Ct. Cl. 1983) (taxpayer's § 1983 claim
alleging due process violation held improper because taxpayer had adequate remedy under state law).
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asserting his section 1983 action.94 Finally, even if he is litigating a sub-
94. Although Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, established that a claimant need not ex-
haust state administrative remedies before asserting a § 1983 claim in federal court, it is not clear
whether this rule is also applicable if the § 1983 action is asserted in state court. See Note, Exhaus-
tion of Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Actions Brought in State Court, 69 IowA L. REv.
1037, 1042-44 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exhaustion of Remedies]. Several state courts have
ruled that Patsy is not applicable to § 1983 actions in state court and that a § 1983 claimant proceed-
ing in state court must exhaust his state administrative remedies. See, e.g., Bartschi v. Chico Commu-
nity Memorial Hosp., 137 Cal. App. 3d 502, 508, 187 Cal. Rptr. 61, 64-65 (3d Dist. 1982) (requir-
ing § 1983 claimant in state court to exhaust administrative remedies); State ex rel. Basham v.
Medical Licensing Bd., 451 N.E.2d 691, 694 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) (same). But see, e.g., Logan v.
Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 136 Cal. App. 3d 116, 124, 185 Cal. Rptr. 878, 883 (2d Dist.
1982) (not requiring § 1983 claimant in state court to exhaust administrative remedies); Fetterman v.
University of Conn., 192 Conn. 539, 549, 473 A.2d 1176, 1181 (1984) (same).
State courts entertaining federal causes of action control their own procedure, see C. WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL Cou'rs 272 (4th ed. 1983), and requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies
can be viewed as a procedural requirement, see Note, Exhaustion of Remedies, supra, at 1044-53.
Although Congress can probably prescribe the procedural rules that a state court adjudicating a fed-
eral cause of action must follow, see C. WRIGHT, supra, at 272, it appears that Congress did not
intend to alter state exhaustion requirements when a § 1983 claim is instituted in state court. In
ruling that claimants asserting § 1983 actions in federal court need not exhaust state administrative
remedies, the Patsy Court was informed by three recurring themes in the congressional debates over
§ 1983. Congress wanted to ensure that § 1983 claimants had immediate access to federal courts, an
independent federal fact finder, and an unimpaired choice between federal and state court. 457 U.S. at
503-07. None of these considerations is implicated, however, when the claimant asserts his § 1983
action in state court. Moreover, there are compelling reasons why a state should be allowed to have a
limited exhaustion requirement, especially in the area of state taxation. Such a requirement would
provide the state an opportunity to correct errors before resorting to costly litigation and would foster
"agency expertise, judicial economy . . . and consistent application of a regulatory scheme." Note,
Fulton Market Cold Storage Co. v. Cullerton: Limiting Federal Jurisdiction in Section 1983 Dam-
age Actions Against Tax Officials, 74 Nw. U.L. REv. 284, 306 & n.120 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Limiting Federal Jurisdiction].
A state cannot, however, establish an administrative exhaustion requirement so onerous that a tax-
payer would prefer to forgo his § 1983 claim rather than incur the expense and trouble of meeting the
state's "procedural" requirement. It is settled that a state may not, under the guise of state procedure,
place obstacles in the path of a federal claimant that defeat his federal rights. See Davis v. Wechsler,
263 U.S. 22, 24-25 (1923). Moreover, an exhaustion requirement for § 1983 actions would have to
apply equally to any state-provided taxpayer remedies. See McKnett, 292 U.S. at 234 (prohibiting
discrimination against federal causes of action). If the state's exhaustion requirement were sufficiently
onerous to dissuade a taxpayer from seeking the remedies under § 1983, it would similarly discourage
the taxpayer from seeking state-provided remedies. Given these circumstances, the taxpayer's state
court remedies-those provided by the state and those under § 1983-would be illusory and therefore
would not comply with the requirements of the Tax Injunction Act, see supra note 15 (remedy must
be "plain, speedy and efficient"), or the principle of comity as articulated by the Court in McNary,
454 U.S. at 116 (remedy must be "plain, adequate, and complete"). Under the Tax Injunction Act
and McNary, therefore, a taxpayer facing such an exhaustion requirement would be granted access to
a federal forum in which he could assert a § 1983 action. This solution suffers in that taxpayers are
forced to assess whether a federal court will find the state court remedy inadequate, but it does ensure
that a state will not ultimately be able to circumvent § 1983 with "procedural" requirements. More-
over, it is possible that an extensive and vexing exhaustion requirement would not comport with the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S.
17 (1920) (taxpayer must have opportunity to challenge unconstitutional state taxation).
Although a state may be allowed to require exhaustion of state administrative remedies, the need to
ensure the protection of federal rights and the desire to promote judicial economy militate against
allowing a state to require § 1983 claimants to exhaust state judicial remedies before proceeding with
their § 1983 claims. See Note, Limiting FederalJurisdiction, supra, at 307 & n.125; cf McNary, 454
U.S. at 134 n.22 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that state tax § 1983 claimants should not be able
to proceed in federal court until they have exhausted their state administrative remedies, but noting
that exhaustion of judicial remedies would not be required).
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stantial federal claim, a state tax section 1983 claimant will not be ex-
empted from paying the tax he owes. Section 1983 neither alters the re-
quirements necessary to obtain equitable relief nor prevents a state from
enforcing its laws.95 Therefore, a taxpayer cannot, by asserting a section
1983 cause of action, prevent a state from taking its usual steps to collect
the taxes which it has levied.
Finally, the decision in McNary, which relied on comity to close the
federal courts to certain state tax section 1983 claims, is not indicative of
any belief that state tax section 1983 actions are themselves improper; the
decision merely reflected the belief that these actions are more appropri-
ately handled by state courts. In fact, the McNary Court stated that sec-
tion 1983 does provide a remedy for taxpayers who are able to prove that
their constitutional or federal rights have been denied by a state."6 The
Court, through Justice Rehnquist, indicated that the taxpayers in Mc-
Nary were free to pursue their federal rights and remedies, including their
section 1983 claim, in state court.97
B. The Proper Defendant in a State Tax Section 1983 Suit
A taxpayer may bring a state tax section 1983 claim against a state
official in her individual capacity, against a state official in her official
capacity, or against a state. A suit against an official, such as a tax as-
sessor, in her individual capacity is appropriate when the taxpayer is al-
leging that the official's discretionary acts-such as overassessing the
property of nonresidents-led to the deprivation of the taxpayer's consti-
tutional rights.98 In an individual-capacity suit, the official is personally
95. The fact that a § 1983 claim is being litigated does not in any way prevent the state from
taxing the claimant and using the normal methods of ensuring that the tax is paid. Only if the tax-
payer is granted an injunction or a declaratory judgment would a state officer face sanctions for
enforcing a tax law. The availability of a § 1983 cause of action will not, however, aid taxpayers in
restraining tax enforcement because § 1983 does not alter the normal considerations that a court of
equity faces. See, e.g., Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 814 (1974) (plaintiff required to prove same
elements to obtain injunctive relief irrespective of whether such relief is sought under § 1983); see also
Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (injunctive relief in § 1983 actions should be granted
"sparingly"). If an adequate remedy exists at law, equitable relief-in the form of an injunction or a
declaratory judgment-will not be granted. See Scott v. Palmerton Area School Dist., 63 Pa. Commw.
528, 533-34, 439 A.2d 859, 862 (1981) (although § 1983 authorizes equitable remedy, such relief will
not be granted if adequate remedy exists at law), affd, 502 Pa. 431, 466 A.2d 1029 (1983).
96. 454 U.S. at 103-04.
97. Id. at 116. See also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 122 (1984)
(discussing state tax § 1983 actions). Given that the federal courts are not available to hear state tax
§ 1983 claims, the Supreme Court's references to such claims suggest that state courts must entertain
these actions. The Pennhurst Court specifically noted that state courts are the only potential fora for
these claims. Id.
98. See Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 3106 (1985). The defendant official in this type of
suit would presumably be permitted to raise a qualified immunity defense if her actions did not
violate a clearly established constitutional right. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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liable for both damages and any award of attorney's fees.99 A suit against
a state100 or a state official in her official capacity0 ' is appropriate when
99. See Kentucky v. Graham, 105 S. Ct. at 3106. For a discussion of whether a state may grant
its officials absolute immunity from suit in state court, see infra note 101.
100. Although the Supreme Court has yet to consider the question, several lower courts have
ruled that states are not subject to suit under § 1983 because a state is not a "person" as that term is
used in § 1983. See, e.g., Holladay v. Montana, 506 F. Supp. 1317, 1321 (D. Mont. 1981); Thomp-
son v. New York, 487 F. Supp. 212, 226 (N.D.N.Y. 1979); cf. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)
(§ 1983 does not abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court). But see
Marrapese v. Rhode Island, 500 F. Supp. 1207, 1212 (D.R.I. 1980) (finding that state is "person"
subject to suit under § 1983). For a thorough discussion of whether a state is a "person," see Note,
supra note 51 (arguing that state is "person"). Even if a state is not a "person" under § 1983, a
taxpayer can still obtain redress by bringing a suit against an official in her official capacity. The
Supreme Court in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (suit for injunctive relief under § 1983
against official in official capacity) made clear that an official sued in her official capacity is a "per-
son" under § 1983. For a general discussion of the immunity of a state from suit in its own courts, see
Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own
Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CAUF. L. REv. 189 (1981).
101. A suit against an official in her official capacity could take two forms. First, the taxpayer
could sue the official for damages under § 1983, and if successful, the taxpayer would recover dam-
ages under § 1983 and attorney's fees under § 1988. Because the taxpayer sued the official in her
official capacity, the state would be financially responsible for the claimant's judgment. See Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. at 694-98 (allowing attorney's fees to be collected from state in suit against official
in official capacity notwithstanding state's immunity from such suit). If, however, an official-capacity
damages action under § 1983 were improper for some reason, then the taxpayer could seek injunctive
or declaratory relief under § 1983 against the official, and invoke state-provided remedies to recover
any unconstitutionally collected taxes. If the taxpayer were successful, he could recover the improper
tax and collect attorney's fees from the state under § 1988. See id.; cf New York Gaslight Club, Inc.
v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980) (allowing successful claimant in Title VII suit to recover all attorney's
fees incurred, including those incurred to comply with administrative remedy exhaustion
requirement).
To prevent taxpayers from obtaining redress under § 1983 in a suit against an official in her
official capacity, a state might attempt to grant its officials immunity from suit in state court. If states
are not directly subject to suits under § 1983, see supra note 100, such a grant of immunity to an
official would effectively foreclose a taxpayer from pursuing the remedies provided by § 1983. Cf
supra note 33 (discussing whether state remedies are "adequate" if they do not include opportunity to
recover remedies provided by §§ 1983 and 1988). In an official-capacity suit, however, the taxpayer is
essentially challenging a wrong committed not by an official but by the state itself. The broad purpose
underlying § 1983 counsels against allowing a state to foreclose a taxpayer from asserting an other-
wise valid cause of action created by Congress to remedy the state's wrong. Cf. General Oil Co. v.
Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 226 (1908) (if Eleventh Amendment precludes suit in federal court and state
could forbid suit in state court, state could prevent enforcement of Constitution).
That states may not deny taxpayers the remedies provided under § 1983 by granting immunity to
officals is also supported by the converse of the Erie doctrine. For a general discussion of converse-
Erie, see Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions-The Converse of the Erie Prob-
lem?, 17 OHIo ST. L.J. 384 (1956). Under converse-Erie, state courts entertaining federal causes of
action must apply federal substantive law, but may apply state procedural law. See C. WIGrr,
supra note 94, at 272; cf. Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916) (state court
hearing federal cause of action need not apply federal procedural law because court continues to draw
its jurisdictional power from state). Because the immunity issue directly affects the outcome of the
suit, and thus the federal policy underlying § 1983, the question of immunity is most properly charac-
terized as a question of federal substantive law and not as a matter of procedure within the control of
the state creating the forum. Cf. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 363 (1952) ("[T]he right
to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the [Federal Employers Liability
Act]" to be denied by conflicting state procedural rules.). Moreover, any claim that the question of
immunity is one for the sovereign empowering the official-in this case, the state-would have little
merit. If the state, merely because it empowered the official, were permitted to exercise control over
official immunity in a federal cause of action in state court, the state would be able to clothe that
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the taxpayer is alleging that a state statute, policy, or procedure is uncon-
stitutional, either facially or as applied. Whether such an action is as-
serted against a state or an official in her official capacity, the state is
responsible for any damages or attorney's fees awarded.102
C. The Impropriety of State Court Refusals: A Misunderstanding of
Federalism
State courts that have refused to adjudicate section 1983 tax claims have
relied upon a broad theory of state immunity from the application of sec-
tion 1983 in the area of state taxation that both disregards the nature of
the relationship between the states and the federal government and is
wholly at odds with the basic policy underlying section 1983. For exam-
ple, states have asserted that "[s]tate remedies . ..may not be circum-
vented by invoking section 1983. '"103 This assertion, however, is inconsis-
tent with the Supreme Court's holding in Monroe v. Pape"' that the
remedies provided under section 1983 are supplemental to any available
state remedies.105 Accordingly, the remedies provided by section 1983, in-
cluding attorney's fees under section 1988, are available in addition to
state-provided remedies.106 That the remedies provided by section 1983
may conflict with state tax policy107 is similarly not a valid justification
for a state court's refusing to entertain actions brought under that section.
In enacting a law such as section 1983, Congress preempts conflicting
state policy.108
Every state court that has refused to entertain a taxpayer's section 1983
claim has gone on to accept jurisdiction over any tax action provided by
state law.109 This practice plainly discriminates against federal causes of
official with immunity from suit in federal court as well. At present, no state has attempted to grant
such immunity, most likely because such a grant would not be respected by the federal courts. To
allow the state this power would be to allow the states to control the scope of § 1983, a clearly
unacceptable result.
102. See supra note 101.
103. Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 281 S.C. 492, 497, 316 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1984),
affd by an equally divided Court, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985) (per curiam).
104. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
105. Id. at 183.
106. See Stratos v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 387 Mass. 312, 317, 439 N.E.2d 778, 783
(1982) ("[Tlhe fact that a plaintiff claiming relief under § 1983 could have obtained relief solely by
means of a State remedy-even a 'routine' one-does not foreclose a fee award."). The holding in
Monroe v. Pape and the logic of Stratos reveal the impropriety of the decision in Stufflebaum v.
Panethiere, 691 S.W.2d 271 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), which held that a state court need not entertain a
state tax § 1983 action if the taxpayer's state-provided remedies were plain, adequate, and complete as
required by McNary. Stufflebaum, 691 S.W.2d at 272.
107. Cf. Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 505-06, 224 S.E.2d 370, 374-75 (1976) (discussing
policy rationale underlying remedies provided by state for improper taxation and ruling that state
court need not entertain state tax § 1983 claim).
108. See Mondou, 223 U.S. at 57.
109. See cases cited supra note 79.
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action, and is therefore prohibited by McKnett.110 Moreover, by entertain-
ing state-provided causes of action, these courts have in effect admitted
that they "have jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under local law" to
adjudicate state tax section 1983 suits, and therefore they must comply
with Testa's requirement that state courts entertain federal causes of
action.""'
CONCLUSION
Given that state courts are the only fora in which a taxpayer may seek
federal remedies, including attorney's fees, and that these remedies are
needed to protect citizens from unconstitutional taxation, it follows that
state courts should not be free to close their doors to taxpayers with sec-
tion 1983 claims. 2 To allow state courts discretion to decide whether to
entertain state tax section 1983 claims, is to make the vindication of fed-
eral rights dependent on the state in which a taxpayer resides. 1 Short of
opening the doors of the federal courts to state tax section 1983
claims-something that the Supreme Court has refused to allow-the only
means available of ensuring consistent protection of federal rights for all
taxpayers is to require state courts to entertain these claims.
110. 292 U.S. at 23.
111. 330 U.S. at 394. No state court that has refused to entertain a state tax § 1983 claim has
addressed whether such a refusal implicates Testa. See cases cited supra note 79.
112. See Gordon & Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 1145, 1189 (1984) ("If. . . Congress were to restrict inferior federal court jurisdiction so that
federal claims had to be brought in state court, then state courts would have to provide the exact
remedy required by federal law.").
113. Although the exact procedure under which a taxpayer's federal claim would be heard might
vary from state to state, see supra note 94, every taxpayer, irrespective of the state in which he lived,
would have the opportunity to assert a federal claim. See Gordon & Gross, supra note 112, at
1163-65 & nn.76-77 (all states have courts of general jurisdiction that are available to entertain
§ 1983 claims).

